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  ABSTRACT 
 
Do ethical motivations and attitudes affect behaviour? We examine this issue in six 
Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games using an online 
experiment where individuals were asked to make choices and subsequently to 
express the motivations for their choices and their general attitudes. The experimental 
evidence of 1,701 students suggests that the motivations and attitudes of respondents 
regarding altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity and aversion to lying are important 
for determining economic choices as well as self-interest. Econometric analysis of the 
choice to share indicates that ethical and self-interested motives are more important 
for determining choices than personal characteristics. 
 
Key words: Individual decision making, ethics, experimental economics, prisoner’s 
dilemma games, student attitudes and motivations 
 
JEL classification: C72, C90, D64
1. Introduction 
Do ethical motivations and attitudes affect behaviour? In recent years, many papers 
have explored non-self-interested motivations in game theory and experimental 
economics, demonstrating that non-self-interested motivations help to explain choices 
alongside self-interest. Therefore there is now general acceptance that individuals 
frequently make choices that do not maximise their monetary payoffs. However, 
despite a relatively large theoretical literature regarding ethics in economics, game 
theory and experimental literature focuses on non-self-interested motivations, rather 
than ethical motivations per se. A standard textbook definition of ethical behaviour is 
behaviour conforming to accepted social or professional standards of conduct. 
‘Ethics’ is derived from the Greek word ‘ethikos’ which is translated as ethos or 
character and hence focuses upon the character traits of the individual, where ethical 
behaviour is behaviour in accordance with a virtuous character. Ethical behaviour is a 
subset of behaviours that may be classed as non-self-interested. However, non-self-
interested behaviours are not necessarily ethical, such as envy or spitefulness. 
 
In the game theory and experimental economics literature decisions are observed in 
order to reveal and assign the preferences and motivations that are in accordance with 
those decisions, concluding that both non-self-interested and self-interested 
motivations are important. However, it can be argued that economics has not 
comprehensively studied human nature, rather economists make propositions 
regarding human nature that are guided by personal opinions rather than incisive 
insights from economics (Gill, 1996). Many papers have explored only a selection of 
non-self-interested motivations, and hence observed behaviour may be explained by 
factors other than those factors that are analysed (Cox, 2004). It therefore appears that 
economists could be accused of making the world fit their theory, not the other way 
round.  
 
Motivations that are currently used in the game theory literature to explain or account 
for why individuals act in ways that are not solely to their self-interest include 
reciprocity, inequality and inequity aversion, fairness, altruism, integrity and aversion 
to lying. A useful distinction between much of the inequity aversion, fairness and 
reciprocity literature is that three categories of game theory models exist (Cox, 2004). 
The first type of model incorporates other-regarding preferences into a utility function 
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(see Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), the second type of 
model incorporates beliefs regarding the intentions of other players into a utility 
function (see Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004, and Rabin, 1993) and the third type 
of model incorporates both other-regarding preferences and intentions into a utility 
function (see Charness and Rabin, 2002, and Falk and Fischbacher, 2000). 
 
Inequality aversion and inequity aversion are considered jointly as the literature rarely 
distinguishes between inequality and inequity, and the majority of the literature uses 
the term ‘inequity’. Inequality aversion occurs when an individual derives a disutility 
if they have a lower payoff than another individual, and furthermore some individuals 
may experience a disutility if they have a higher payoff than another individual. Issues 
of fairness are related in the literature to inequality aversion if the individual is 
concerned whether their payoff is equitable and hence fair in comparison to the 
payoffs of other individuals, and this is called inequity aversion. Leading game theory 
models in this category are Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Charness and Rabin (2002) and 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). However Charness and Rabin (2002) find little 
evidence for inequity aversion in their experimental data. 
 
Reciprocity analyses situations where individuals have mutual dependences, actions 
or influence, and hence where there is a mutual or cooperative exchange of favours or 
benefits. Reciprocal behaviour can be understood as a specific example of ethical 
behaviour, where the principle of reciprocity may be one accepted standard of 
conduct that belongs to the set of accepted standards of conduct that govern ethical 
behaviour. Game theory models analysing fairness, reciprocity and intentions in a 
game theory context are Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004, 2005), Rabin (1993), 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Blount (1995), Falk and Fischbacher (2000), 
Cox (2004) and McCabe et al. (2003).1 Charness and Rabin (2002), Fehr and Gachter 
(2000), Berg et al. (1995) and McCabe et al. (2003) find that reciprocity is important 
in explaining experimental data. 
 
Altruism focuses upon an individual’s regard for the well-being of another individual, 
and this has subtle differences to inequity aversion and fairness which instead focus 
upon the own position of the individual in comparison to the position of other 
individuals. Therefore issues of inequity aversion and fairness arise from how the 
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individual believes they are being treated, and reciprocity arises as a response to the 
actions of another individual. In contrast, altruism does not focus upon how others 
treat or regard you, it instead focuses upon how you wish to treat and regard others. 
Altruism in a game theory context is analysed by Gintis (2000), Levine (1998) and 
Andreoni and Miller (1993). Charness and Haruvy (2002) use a hybrid game theory 
model which incorporates issues of altruism, reciprocity and concerns over 
distribution and hence equity and fairness. Andreoni and Miller (1993), Hu and Liu 
(2003) and Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) find that altruism is important in 
explaining experimental data and Charness and Haruvy (2002) and Cox (2004) find 
that both altruism and reciprocity are important in explaining experimental data. 
 
Integrity and keeping promises leads to trust, and trust in turn enables economic 
transactions without costly enforceable contracts. Lying reduces trust as it leads to 
doubt regarding integrity and the reliability of promises. Minkler and Miceli (2004) 
argue using a game theory model that in some circumstances individuals will keep 
their promises due to the notion of integrity, and hence integrity provides a moral or 
ethical motivation rather than a material motivation to keep promises rather than lie, 
even if those promises are non-credible and are against the material advantage of the 
individual. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004) analyse promises and threats finding 
that promises are credible using experimental data. 
 
The game theory models and experimental approaches in the literature focus upon 
observed or hypothetical decisions in order to reveal and assign the preferences and 
motivations that are in accordance with those decisions. One disadvantage of this 
approach is that it is not possible to conclusively determine the motivation behind the 
observed behaviour as multiple motivations are consistent with the observed data. The 
experimental data may indicate that an individual is acting reciprocally yet their 
behaviour could also be explained by motivations of altruism or other-regarding 
preferences (Cox, 2004). 
 
The purpose of this paper is to determine which motivations and attitudes are 
important for determining choices. The paper further analyses whether personal 
characteristic variables are important for determining choices, and analyses the 
linkages between choices, underlying motivations and general attitudes. The principal 
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advantage of this study is that the motivations behind decisions are determined by 
asking respondents directly what motivated their decisions, rather than by observing 
respondents decisions in order to reveal their preferences and to subsequently assign 
motivations that are in accordance with those decisions. Furthermore the study 
determines which attitudes and motivations are important from a comprehensive list 
and hence the study incorporates more motivations than previous approaches. This 
enables multiple explanations for observed behaviour and reduces the problem that 
observed behaviour may be explained by factors other than those factors that are 
analysed.  
 
The focus of this study is upon ethical motivations rather than non-self-interested 
motivations in general, in order to analyse empirically whether ethics are important 
for determining choices as proposed by the large theoretical literature on ethics and 
economics. In order to operationalise ethical behaviour it must be specified as 
behaviour conforming to a set of principles, and the principles used here are altruism, 
inequality aversion, reciprocity and aversion to lying. Inequality aversion is used 
rather than inequity aversion as issues of fairness are not addressed. The ethical 
behaviour operationalised here does not encompass all possible ethical principles, but 
arguably encompasses all principles that are relevant in the experimental context used 
here.  
 
Our results suggest that ethical motivations and attitudes alongside self-interest are 
important for determining choices. In what follows, section 2 outlines the 
experimental design, analysis and respondents, section 3 presents the results, section 4 
provides discussion and section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Experimental design 
Six Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games were conducted to 
analyse choices, motivations and the underlying attitudes and values that are present 
in individual economic decision-making. An online questionnaire was used due to its 
many advantages: low costs, short time-span, quick and accurate data collection, 
relatively large sample size and reduction of experimenter bias.2 A potential criticism 
of survey experiments is their absence of monetary rewards. But, as Rubinstein (2007) 
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points out, there appears to be no significant difference between survey results and 
results in experiments with monetary rewards. The focus of the online questionnaire 
was upon determining the motivations behind decisions in a game theory context by 
asking respondents directly what motivated their decisions in six modifications of a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the strategies ‘share’ or ‘compete’, and furthermore 
determining their overall self-interested and ethical beliefs. Respondents were 
questioned firstly about their personal characteristics, secondly to make choices in the 
six games, thirdly about what motivated these choices and fourthly about their general 
attitudes. 
 
The first Prisoner’s Dilemma game is shown in figure 1 below where ‘you’ refers to 
the respondent. As illustrated in figure 1 below, the payoff for mutual competition is 
£50, the payoff for competing when the other player, player 2, shares is £100, the 
payoff for mutual sharing is £75 and the payoff for sharing when then other player, 
player 2, competes is £25.  
 
Game 2 uses a modification of the payoffs in game 1 to determine how actions are 
affected when the payoffs are changed such that all payoffs are higher but the 
differences between the payoffs are reduced.3 Therefore although the respondent 
receives higher monetary payoffs from competing, their payoffs are only slightly 
higher through competing than sharing, and player 2 receives much higher payoffs if 
the respondent shares rather than competes. Payoffs are shown in figure 2 below. 
 
Game 3 uses a modification of the payoffs in game 1 to determine how actions are 
affected when the payoffs are changed such that the highest payoff is reduced when 
the respondent competes and the other player shares. The change in the payoff is 
chosen because if the respondent dislikes having a higher payoff than the other player 
competing is now more attractive than in game one. However the monetary advantage 
of choosing to compete is now vastly reduced and hence the respondent may instead 
choose to share thus demonstrating that it is the high monetary payoff of £100 that 
encourages respondents to compete. Payoffs are shown in figure 3 below. 
 
Game 4 uses a modification of the payoffs in game 1 to determine how actions are 
affected when the payoffs are changed such that the highest payoff now occurs under 
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mutual sharing, there is no dominant strategy and the game is no longer a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game. This game also tests whether responses are affected by the type of 
game. Payoffs are shown in figure 4 below. 
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Player 2
You
Share
Compete
Share
Compete
£105, £105 £65, £110
£110, £65 £70, £70
 
Player 2
You
Share
Compete
Share
Compete
£75, £75 £25, £100
£100, £25 £50, £50
 
Fig. 2 Game 2 Fig. 1 Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
(game 1)  
 
  
 
  
Player 2
You
Share
Compete
Share
Compete
£105, £105 £65, £100
£100, £65 £70, £70
 
Player 2
You
Share
Compete
Share
Compete
£75, £75 £25, £80
£80, £25 £50, £50
 
Fig. 4 Game 4 Fig. 3 Game 3 
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 Games 5 and 6 use the same payoffs as game 1 as shown in figure 1, but change the 
format of the game by introducing a prior stage where the respondent can choose to 
send a message to player 2 that says ‘I promise I will share’. Respondents are told that 
they cannot have any other communication with player 2, that both players make their 
choice at the same time, and that they have no control over the choice of player 2. 
Each player is then told whether or not the other player decided to send a message. 
Finally the respondent then chooses whether to actually share or compete. Game 5 
examines reciprocal altruism and to some extent lying as respondents are first asked 
whether they wish to send the message to the other player saying ‘I promise I will 
share’. The respondent is then told that player 2 has sent them a message saying ‘I 
promise I will share’, and are then asked whether they wish to share or compete. The 
respondent is subsequently told to suppose instead that player 2 has not sent a 
message and are then asked whether they wish to share or compete in order to 
determine whether the choice to share or compete is affected by whether player 2 has 
sent a message saying ‘I promise I will share’. This game therefore analyses whether 
reciprocal altruism is a motivating factor, as the respondent plays firstly against a 
player who has made a promise to share and secondly against a player who has not 
made a promise to share. 
 
Game 6 examines lying whilst also analysing reciprocal altruism. The only difference 
that occurs in game 6 in comparison to game 5 is that respondents are now told that 
player 2 dislikes breaking their promises. Otherwise the game remains unchanged in 
order to analyse whether the knowledge that player 2 dislikes lying affects responses. 
 
Respondents made their decisions in all six games before they were questioned about 
what motivated their decisions. Respondents were asked to tick from a list all 
motivations they considered or used to make their decisions, refer to table 4 for the 
list. The list of 17 motivations included altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity, an 
aversion to lying and self-interest in order to appropriately capture the differing 
motivations of respondents. The list of motivations was based upon the literature and 
upon ethical principles of conduct applicable to Prisoner’s Dilemma games. 
Furthermore respondents were asked whether any other factor was used to make their 
choices to ensure that all motivations were appropriately captured. A jumbled 
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ordering was used for the list and hence not all motivations regarding altruism 
appeared next to each other so that respondents consider each factor alone in order to 
monitor consistency and encourage greater consideration. The wording chosen for 
each of the factors was as simple as possible and did not include the words ‘altruism, 
inequality aversion, reciprocity or self-interest,’ to avoid affecting responses by the 
wording of the questions and to encourage greater understanding.  
 
Respondents were then questioned about their underlying attitudes and values. 
Respondents were asked how much they agree or disagree with 20 statements, refer to 
table 5 for the statements. Each factor of altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity, 
aversion to lying and self-interest had 4 statements each. Similar statements were not 
grouped, some negative statements were included such as ‘I break a promise if it 
benefits me’ and some generalised statements were included such as ‘Breaking 
promises is bad’. The statements were varied throughout the section so that 
respondents realise there are differences in the format of the statements. 
 
2.2 The analysis 
The results are reported firstly in terms of the proportion of respondents who chose 
each answer to the questions regarding choices, motivations and attitudes. Secondly 
probit regression analysis is used to quantify the effects of personal characteristics, 
motivations and attitudes on the choice to share. The binary dependent variable takes 
the value 1 if the individual chose ‘share’ and 0 for ‘compete’.4 The probability of 
choosing share depends upon personal characteristics such as sex, age and so forth, 
and arguably upon motivations and attitudes.5 For games 1, 2, 3 and 4 a regression is 
estimated to determine the probability of choosing share as a function of personal 
characteristics, motivations and attitudes as demonstrated in equation (1) below. S is 
the choice to share or compete, C is a vector of personal characteristics, M is a vector 
of motivations and A is a vector of indices representing attitudes. 
 
( )AM,C,SS =      (1) 
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The model as specified in equation (1) can be expressed respectively as a standard 
univariate probit model of the choice to share (Greene, 1998, 2000; Alexandre and 
French, 2004): 
 
( )ε+++Φ== AβMβCβ 321)1Pr(S    (2) 
 
where Pr represents probability, the iβ ’s are parameters to estimate, the function ( ).Φ  
is the distribution function of the standard normal distribution and ε  is the error term. 
For games 5 and 6 regressions are estimated to determine the probability of choosing 
share as a function of whether a promise to share is made, personal characteristics, 
motivations and attitudes as demonstrated in equation (3) below. For games 5 and 6 
regressions are also estimated to determine the probability of choosing to make a 
promise as a function of personal characteristics, motivations and attitudes as 
demonstrated in equation (4) below. P is the choice to promise. 
 
( )PSS ,AM,C,=     (3) 
( )AM,C,PP =      (4) 
 
The model as specified in equation (3) is expressed respectively as a standard 
univariate probit model of the choice to share in equation (5), and the model as 
specified in equation (4) is expressed respectively as a standard univariate probit 
model of the choice to promise in equation (6). 
  
( )εβ ++++Φ== PS 14)1Pr( AβMβCβ 131211    (5) 
( )ε+++Φ== AβMβCβ 232221)1Pr(P               (6) 
 
All regressions are specified using the general-to-specific technique and hence 
different motivation and attitude variables are appropriate for different games. The 
specification of the models is identical for games 5 and 6 to enable greater 
comparison. 
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The attitude index combines the responses to the four attitude questions outlined in 
table 2. Responses for each question are numbered according to the scale that 4 = 
response in strongest agreement with the attitude and 0 = response in weakest 
agreement. For example, for the attitude index representing attitudes in accordance 
with altruism, the first question in table 5 asks respondents how much they agree or 
disagree with the statement ‘I am a generous person’, and the responses are coded 
according to the scale that 4 = agree strongly, 3 = agree slightly, 2 = neither agree nor 
disagree, 1 = disagree slightly and 0 = disagree strongly. The scale is reversed for the 
second statement ‘I am a self-centred person’. The responses for all four statements 
regarding altruism are aggregated to give a total out of 16 and then the total is divided 
by 16 to determine the index and hence the index lies between 0 and 1. A value of 0 
indicates weak agreement with statements regarding altruism, and a value of 1 
indicates strong agreement.  
 
2.3 The respondents 
The study was carried out at the University of Sheffield, UK in February and March 
2006. All undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of Sheffield 
received an email requesting them to complete the questionnaire and hence all 
participants were volunteers and were not pre-selected. Information that respondents 
are given prior to the completion of the questionnaire is very important. In order to 
reduce respondent bias the objective of the questionnaire to analyse motivations and 
attitudes in economic decision-making is not stated in the email or introduction to the 
questionnaire, because if respondents are aware of the objective of the questionnaire 
this may encourage responses from respondents interested in the objective and may 
bias responses through a greater awareness that the questions are focussing upon 
motivations and attitudes. Therefore respondents are informed in the email and 
introduction to the questionnaire that they are being invited to take part in a research 
project examining the way people make decisions in real world transactions.  
 
The sample of 1,701 students is 7.27% of the total population which is a relatively 
high response rate for this recruitment method.6 The characteristics of the 
respondents, and how they compare with the University of Sheffield student 
population, are shown in table 1. The sample is older, has a higher proportion of 
females and students from the faculty of Pure Science and a lower proportion of 
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students from the faculty of Medicine than the University of Sheffield student 
population. 
 
Table 1  
Respondent characteristics (n=1,701) 
Characteristic Sample University of Sheffield7
Sex   
       Male 37% 45% 
       Female 63% 55% 
   
Age group   
       Under 21 51% 70% 
       21-24 34% 15% 
       25-39 13% 12% 
       40-59 2% 2% 
       60+ 0% 0% 
   
Student status   
       Undergraduate 79% 79% 
       Taught postgraduate 11% 12% 
       Research postgraduate 10% 8% 
   
Faculty   
       Architectural Studies 3% 5% 
       Arts 19% 14% 
       Engineering 13% 10% 
       Law 8% 7% 
       Medicine 10% 23% 
       Pure Science 34% 15% 
       Social Science 30% 26% 
       Respondents in more than 
one faculty in the questionnaire 
16% - 
Monthly term-time expenditure   
       £0-£199 22% - 
       £200-£399 46% - 
       £400-£599 19% - 
       £600-£799 5% - 
       £800-£999 3% - 
       £1000-£1199 3% - 
       Over £1200 2% - 
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3. Results 
3.1 Choices 
Table 2 shows the results of the choice to share or compete in the six Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games. In game 1 a large proportion of the 
population chose compete but a significant number of respondents did not choose 
compete and this is in accordance with much of the literature regarding the standard 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. A much larger proportion of respondents chose share in 
game 2 than in game 1. In game 3 the proportions are identical to game 1 but cross-
tabulations (not reported here) indicate that 15% of the sample chose different options 
in games 1 and 3. Game 4 is a coordination game and hence there is no dominant 
strategy, and more respondents chose share rather than compete.  
 
Table 2 shows that a large proportion of respondents chose to make a promise to share 
in game 5 and table 3 shows that 73% of respondents who chose to make a promise to 
share kept their promise when the other player also made a promise, but only 29% 
kept their promise to share when the other player did not make a promise. Table 2 
shows that a larger proportion of respondents chose to make a promise to share in 
game 6 when the respondent is told that the other player dislikes lying, and table 3 
shows that this increases the proportion of players who kept their promise to share 
when the other player also made a promise to share, but reduces the proportion of 
players who kept their promise to share when the other player did not make a promise 
to share. For respondents who chose to not make a promise to share in games 5 and 6, 
the proportions of respondents choosing compete is similar for game 1 when no 
promise is received from the other player, but when a message is received from the 
other player the proportion of players choosing compete is much higher. For games 5 
and 6 when no message is received from the other player the proportion of all 
respondents choosing compete is higher than for game 1, regardless of whether a 
promise is made, yet the payoffs are identical for games 1, 5 and 6. Using the chi-
squared p-value, the choice to compete or share is not independent at the 1% 
significance level of the choice made regarding whether to send a promise, both for 
when a message is received and when no message is received from player 2, for both 
game 5 and game 6. 
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Table 2  
Results of the six Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games 
 Compete, % Share, % n 
Game 1 67.24 32.76 1697 
Game 2 51.94 48.06 1698 
Game 3 67.12 32.88 1697 
Game 4 40.95 59.05 1697 
    
 No promise made, % Promise made, % n 
Game 5 - promise to share 39.94 60.06 1695 
Game 6 - promise to share 31.14 68.86 1699 
    
 Compete, % Share, % n 
Game 5 - message received   43.15 56.85 1687 
Game 5 - no message received 77.26 22.74 1684 
Game 6 - message received   34.43 65.57 1696 
Game 6 - no message received 76.70 23.30 1691 
n records the number of responses for each game, thus indicating under 1% missing responses. 
 
Table 3  
Analysis of the effect of promises in games 5 and 6 
 Game 5 - message received   Game 5 - no message received 
 Compete, % Share, % n Compete, % Share, % n 
No promise made 67.86 32.14 672 86.65 13.35 674 
Promise made 26.73 73.27 1014 70.93 29.07 1008 
Total 43.12 56.88 1686 77.23 22.77 1682 
       
 Game 6 - message received   Game 6 - no message received 
 Compete, % Share, % n Compete, % Share, % n 
No promise made 61.03 38.97 526 88.19 11.81 525 
Promise made 22.5 77.5 1169 71.59 28.41 1165 
Total 34.45 65.55 1695 76.75 23.25 1690 
 
3.2 Motivations 
Table 4 lists the motivating factors for the choices in the six Prisoner’s Dilemma and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma related games used in this study. These responses appear to 
suggest that self-interest captures the motivations of a large proportion of respondents, 
but also a significant proportion of respondents do not act according to standard 
economic assumptions based on self-interest. The motivating factors used in this 
study include altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity, aversion to lying and self-
interest and other motivating factors in accordance with standard economic 
assumptions based on self-interest. The list of motivating factors include both 
positive/pure and negative altruism and inferiority and superiority aversion in order to 
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capture a wide range of motivations. For example ‘did not want player 2 to have a 
high payoff’ cannot be regarded as pure altruism but is instead classed as altruism in a 
negative sense. Furthermore ‘avoided payoffs for myself that were much lower than 
player 2’ measures inferiority aversion, where the respondent dislikes having a lower 
payoff than the other player. The responses in table 4 demonstrate that altruism, 
inequality aversion, reciprocity and aversion to lying are motivating factors for a large 
proportion of respondents, as well as self-interest and other motivating factors in 
accordance with standard economic assumptions based on self-interest. 
 
Other motivating factors analysed in the study include ‘didn’t understand the game’ 
and ‘other, please specify’, where 202 respondents specified other motivations. Many 
respondents reiterated previous motivations, but the responses to this question can be 
roughly separated into 3 groups: respondents who had difficulties or questions 
regarding the game, respondents primarily motivated by factors included in standard 
economic assumptions based on self-interest and respondents primarily motivated by 
ethical factors. The responses were varied and there were no common responses. 
Overall this appears to suggests that the list in table 4 captures the majority of 
motivations and that no additional significant motivating factors were important.  
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Table 4  
Motivating factors for responses in six Prisoner’s Dilemma and Prisoner’s Dilemma 
related games 
Motivation Response, % n 
 Every 
time 
Sometimes Never  
Altruism as a motivating factor     
       Wanted player 2 to have a high payoff 6.54 33.88 59.58 1697 
       Did not want player 2 to have a high payoff 18.36 37.97 43.66 1688 
       Wanted player 2 to have a low payoff 11.83 31.22 56.95 1691 
       Did not want player 2 to have a low payoff 12.42 36.37 51.21 1691 
     
Inequality aversion as a motivating factor     
       Avoided payoffs for myself that are much higher than 
player 2 
11.87 29.12 59.01 1693 
       Avoided payoffs for myself that were much lower than 
player 2  
55.15 25.59 19.25 1688 
       Wanted equal payoffs for myself and player 2 25.21 49.82 24.97 1690 
     
Reciprocity and aversion to lying as motivating factors8     
       Responded to the promise of player 2 52.93 36.22 10.85 1687 
       Used whether or not player 2 made a promise to share to 
anticipate their choice whether or not to share 
51.27 36.35 12.37 1689 
       Kept your promise 55.81 28.02 16.17 1695 
       Did not want to lie by breaking a promise 55.90 24.26 19.83 1694 
     
Motivating factors in accordance with standard economic 
assumptions based on self-interest 
    
       Did not want to have a low payoff 72.17 19.83 7.99 1689 
       Wanted to have a high payoff 67.91 26.89 5.20 1692 
       Wanted to have the highest payoff possible 54.99 33.98 11.03 1695 
       Used the potential amounts of money received to 
anticipate the choice of player 2 
28.61 41.96 29.43 1692 
     
Other motivating factors     
       Didn’t understand the game 2.01 15.46 82.52 1688 
       Other, please specify 15.64 9.77 74.59 921 
 
3.3 Attitudes 
Table 5 summarises the responses for general attitudes and values. The responses 
indicate how much respondents agree or disagree with statements regarding altruism, 
inequality aversion, reciprocity, aversion to lying and self-interest. These responses 
suggest that self-interest captures the attitudes and values of some respondents, but 
also a significant proportion of respondents do not have attitudes that are accurately 
captured by self-interest alone. The responses indicate strong attitudes regarding 
altruism and reciprocity and strong attitudes towards promises and aversion to lying. 
Only 14% of respondents agree that they break a promise if it benefits them, 
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suggesting that the majority of respondents keep their promises even if it benefits 
them to break it. Attitudes regarding self-interest suggest that the majority of 
respondents do consider and are concerned by how their actions affect others. 
Attitudes regarding inequality aversion are mixed as significant proportions of 
respondents demonstrate all possible responses in this section.  
 
Table 5  
Responses for attitudinal questions 
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Attitudinal statement Disagree 
strongly  
Disagree 
slightly  
Neither agree nor 
disagree  
Agree 
slightly  
Agree 
strongly  
n 
Altruism       
       I am a generous person  0.18 2.95 12.55 56.87 27.46 1697 
       I am a self-centred person 23.49 37.01 18.36 19.24 1.89 1694 
       Being concerned with other people’s welfare is good 0.18 0.94 4.42 31.49 62.97 1696 
       If the welfare of others increases this causes my welfare to increase  2.84 9.88 39.11 36.21 11.95 1690 
       
Inequality       
       I dislike income inequality 6.89 13.14 24.51 31.59 23.87 1697 
       I would prefer to have similar income to others rather than much 
higher income than others 
7.41      20.51 30.71 27.27 14.11 1687
       I like other people to have more money than me  10.61 30.42 53.83 3.95 1.18 1696 
       I like having more money than others 7.30 14.95 43.24 28.00 6.52 1686 
       
Reciprocity       
       I am more likely to be nice to people who are nice to me  0.83 2.07 3.08 32.98 61.04 1689 
       I am more likely to respond generously to generous people  1.06 2.66 10.35 35.19 50.74 1691 
       I treat others how they treat me 3.13 11.10 12.64 46.78 26.34 1693 
       I am more concerned with other people’s welfare if they are 
concerned with my welfare  
3.02      12.18 20.17 44.35 20.28 1691
       
Promises and an aversion to lying       
       I keep my promises 0.47 1.83 8.27 42.91 46.51 1692 
       I feel bad if I break a promise 0.95 3.01 4.49 31.66 59.89 1693 
       Breaking promises is bad 0.77 2.60 7.09 31.56 57.98 1692 
       I break a promise if it benefits me  39.35 33.04 13.27 13.45 0.88 1695 
       
Self-interest       
       I am concerned about how my actions affect others  0.35 1.42 5.14 39.72 53.37 1692 
       I consider how my actions affect others  0.30 1.07 4.20 45.92 48.52 1690 
       I always choose to do what benefits me most  11.33 29.99 24.85 29.22 4.60 1694 
       I choose to do what benefits me regardless of how it affects others 32.33 40.25 14.54 11.82 1.06 1692 
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3.4 Choices, motivations and attitudes 
Tables 6 and 7 summarise the results of the probit regressions. Table 6 summarises 
the results for all personal characteristics variables included in the regressions for all 
games. Table 7 summarises the results for all motivation and attitude variables 
included in the regressions for all games. Table A1 in the appendix shows the 
marginal effects of the probit regressions for all games. Tables 6 and 7 indicate that 
the personal characteristics variables are largely insignificant and the variables 
representing motivations and attitudes are highly significant. We have shown 
elsewhere that the use of variables representing motivations and attitudes provides 
better specified models than using personal characteristics variables alone and that the 
motivation variables are more effective than the attitude variables (Rowen and 
Dietrich, 2007). Table A3 in the appendix shows the Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients for the motivation and attitude variables. Correlations are generally weak 
hence multicollinearity should not be a problem and therefore the use of these 
motivation and attitude dummy variables together is acceptable.  
 
Table 7 illustrates that the sign and significance of the motivation and attitude 
variables are robust across all regression models. Overall the regression results 
indicate that motivations regarding altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity and 
assumptions of standard economic theory based on self-interest and attitudes in 
accordance with altruism, aversion to lying and self-interest are statistically 
significant.  
 
 
Table 6  
Summary of personal characteristics variables used in the econometric models for each game 
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Game 1 2 3 4 5 promise 5 message received 5 no message received 6 promise 6 message received 6 no message received 
Female N    – – – – + N – + – 
Faculty of Architecture          N N N – N N – N N N
Faculty of Engineering – N N N N N N N N N 
Faculty of Law N N N – N N N N N N 
Faculty of Medicine           N N N N N N N N N N
Faculty of Pure Science N N N N N N N N N N 
Faculty of Social Science N N N N N N N N N N 
Dual faculty student N          N N N + N N N N N
Economics student N         N N N N N N + N N
Age 21-24 + N N       N N – N N N N
Age 25-39 N N N        N N – N N – N
Aged 40 or above + N N N N N N N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure £200 -399 N N N N N – N N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure £400 -599 N N N N N N N N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure £600 -799 N N N N N N N N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure £800 -999 N N N N N N N N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure £1000 -1199 N N N + N N + N N N 
Monthly term-time expenditure over £1200 N + N + N N N N N N 
Non-white –          – N N N N N N N +
Notes: A ‘+’ sign indicates that the relationship is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, a ‘–’ sign indicates that the relationship is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level, ‘N’ indicates that the variable was included in the regression but was not significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
Table 7  
Summary of motivation and attitude variables used in the econometric models for each game 
 
21
 
Game       1 2 3 4 5
promise 
6 
promise 
5 
message 
received 
6 
message 
received 
5 no 
message 
received 
6 no 
message 
received 
Motivation variables            
Altruism Wanted player 2 to have a high payoff  +         
 Did not want player 2 to have a high payoff    – – – N – – – 
Inequality aversion Avoiding payoffs for myself that are much 
higher than player 2 
+         + + +  + +
 Wanted equal payoffs for myself and player 2 + + + + + + + + + + 
Reciprocity           Responded to the promise of player 2  + +
Standard economic 
assumptions based 
on self-interest  
Used the potential amounts of money received 
to anticipate the choice of player 2 
–          – – –
 Did not want to have a low payoff –          
 Used whether or not player 2 made a promise 
to share to anticipate their choice whether or 
not to share 
        – – 
 Wanted to have the highest payoff possible – – – –   – – – – 
            
Attitude variables            
Altruism Attitude index representing attitudes in 
accordance with altruism 
          + + + +
Aversion to lying Attitude index representing attitudes in 
accordance with the avoidance and 
undesirability of lying 
    – – + + N N 
Self interest Attitude index representing attitudes in 
accordance with self-interest and standard 
economic assumptions based on self-interest 
        – – 
Notes: A ‘+’ sign indicates that the relationship is positive and significant at the 10 percent level, a ‘–’ sign indicates that the relationship is negative and significant at the 10 
percent level, ‘N’ indicates that the variable was included in the regression but was not significant at the 10 percent level, all blank cells indicate that the variable was not 
included in the regression. 
4. Discussion 
4.1 Personal characteristics 
Few personal characteristics variables are significant in the regressions for each game 
and no variables are significant for all games. The results indicate that females often 
have a lower probability of sharing yet there is not a robust pattern across all games. 
This is in accordance with the literature, as, for example, Rapoport and Chammah 
(1965) find that females have a lower frequency of cooperative choices, whereas 
Frank, Gilovich and Regan (1993), Hu and Liu (2003) and Ortmann and Tichy (1999) 
find the opposite. Females generally have a lower probability of making a promise to 
share. The results are mixed regarding faculties, but the reference group of students 
from the faculty of arts generally demonstrate a higher probability of sharing and 
making a promise to share.9 The relationship for expenditure is not straightforward, 
and expenditure is rarely statistically significant, suggesting that although these 
payoffs are high relative to the monthly expenditure of these students, the size and 
scaling of the payoffs chosen does not affect the results.  
 
4.2 Altruism and inequality aversion 
Many respondents stated that altruistic motivations were considered or used to make 
their choices and many respondents stated strong attitudes regarding altruism, both 
positive/pure and negative altruism. Table 7 shows that altruism as a motivating factor 
is statistically significant in games 2 and 4 and games 5 and 6 when no message is 
received, game 6 when a message is received and the choice to make a promise in 
games 5 and 6. The altruistic motivation used in the regressions with the exception of 
game 2 is negative altruism, where not wanting player 2 to have a high payoff reduces 
the probability of sharing or making a promise to share for all games. The altruistic 
motivation used in game 2 is positive altruism which increases the probability of 
sharing. Attitudes in accordance with altruism are statistically significant and increase 
the probability of sharing in games 2 and 4 and the choice to make a promise in games 
5 and 6.  
 
Many respondents stated that motivations regarding inequality aversion were 
considered or used to make their choices. However, the largest proportion of 
respondents stated that inferiority aversion was considered or used to make their 
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choices, where the respondent did not want to have a lower payoff than the other 
player. This is not appropriately regarded as ethical. Attitudes regarding inequality 
aversion are mixed as table 4 showed that significant proportions of respondents 
demonstrate all possible responses in this section. However, table 4 shows that 
‘wanting equal payoffs for myself and player 2’ is a motivating factor for 75% of 
respondents, and hence responses regarding inequality aversion as a motivating factor 
demonstrate that inequality aversion is important, yet general attitudes towards 
inequality aversion are more mixed. One reason may be that two attitudinal statements 
are phrased in terms of money and two attitudinal statements are phrased in terms of 
income, yet results do not appear to be affected by this. Another reason may be that 
income inequality as a general principle may be different to income inequality 
aversion amongst two players. For example, an individual may believe that income 
inequality is not undesirable in a society, yet may not wish to cause inequality 
amongst themselves and another individual as a result of their choices.  
 
Table 7 shows that equality as a motivating factor is statistically significant in all 
games, where wanting equal payoffs for both players increases the probability of 
sharing or making a promise to share. Inferiority aversion is statistically significant as 
a motivating factor in games 1, 2, 3 and 4 and in games 5 and 6 when no message is 
received, where a dislike of having a higher payoff than the other player increases the 
probability of sharing or making a promise to share.  
 
4.3 Promises, reciprocity and lying 
Tables 7 and 8 indicate that making a promise to share increases the probability of 
sharing.10 The results of the Wald test statistics for games 5 and 6 are shown in table 
A1 in the appendix and can be summarised in three points. Firstly the results suggest 
that there are differences between individuals who choose to send a message saying ‘I 
promise I will share’ and those who actually share. Secondly the results suggest that 
reciprocity affects responses as the estimated coefficients are affected by whether a 
message is received from the other player. Thirdly the results suggest that the 
knowledge that the other player dislikes lying also affects responses. These three 
points are also illustrated in tables 2 and 3 as the questionnaire responses are different 
for games 5 and 6, and in table A1 in the appendix because the marginal effects and 
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the regressors that are statistically significant are affected by the game, whether the 
model is for the choice to promise or to share and whether or not a message is 
received. These three points are in accordance with the argument that factors such as 
reciprocity and aversion to lying affect choices in a game theory context. 
 
Many respondents stated that motivations regarding reciprocity were considered or 
used to make their choices and many respondents stated strong attitudes regarding 
reciprocity. Table 7 shows that reciprocity is statistically significant as a motivating 
factor in games 5 and 6 where a message is received, where ‘responding to the 
promise of player 2’ increases the probability of sharing. Attitudes in agreement with 
reciprocity are not statistically significant in any of the regression models. One 
argument is that motivation variables represent principles that are strategically 
important, as they constitute the plan for achieving a long-term goal whilst fully 
considering the interactions amongst players in a game theoretic context. Attitude 
variables represent principles that are intrinsically important, and are therefore 
exogenous characteristics that define the moral make-up of the person and hence 
determine their long-term goals. This suggests that reciprocity may be strategically 
important rather than intrinsically important for choices in the games. 
 
Many respondents stated that motivations regarding an aversion to lying were 
considered or used to make their choices and many respondents stated strong attitudes 
regarding the undesirability and aversion to lying. Table 7 shows that an aversion to 
lying is not statistically significant as a motivating factor for any of the models, 
suggesting that an aversion to lying may be intrinsically important rather than 
strategically important in the models. One factor to be taken into consideration is that 
the proportion of respondents who state that keeping their promise is a motivating 
factor is higher than the proportion of respondents who chose to make a promise in 
both game 5 and game 6. This may be because some respondents decided not to 
promise because they would not have been able to keep the promise. Attitudes in 
agreement with the avoidance and undesirability of lying are statistically significant in 
games 5 and 6, where they reduce the probability of making a promise. The lying 
index increases the probability of sharing when a message is received in games 5 and 
6 thus suggesting that individuals who do not wish to lie and who believe that 
breaking promises is bad are more likely to share potentially for two different reasons: 
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firstly they believe that the other player will keep their promise to share, and secondly 
if the individual made a promise to share they are more likely to keep the promise.  
 
4.4 Self-interest 
Many respondents did not choose share for each of the Prisoner’s Dilemma games and 
Prisoner’s Dilemma related games which is the choice that maximises self-interest. 
Many respondents stated that motivations regarding self-interest or motivations in 
accordance with standard economic assumptions based on self-interest were 
considered or used to make their choices, yet few respondents stated strong attitudes 
regarding self-interest or attitudes in accordance with standard economic assumptions 
based on self-interest theory. Table 7 shows that motivations representing self interest 
and standard economic assumptions based on self-interest are statistically significant 
for all games with the exception of the choice to promise in games 5 and 6. Using the 
potential amounts of money received to anticipate the choice of player 2 is statistically 
significant and reduces the probability of sharing in games 1 and 2 and games 5 and 6 
when a message is received. Not wanting to have a low payoff is statistically 
significant and reduces the probability of sharing in game 1. Using whether or not 
player 2 made a promise to share to anticipate their choice whether or not to share is 
statistically significant and reduces the probability of sharing in games 5 and 6 when 
no message is received. Wanting the highest payoff possible is statistically significant 
and reduces the probability of sharing for all games but is unimportant for the choice 
to promise in games 5 and 6. Attitudes in agreement with self-interest are statistically 
significant and reduce the probability of sharing in games 2 and 4. 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
 
Experimental evidence reported here suggests that ethical motivations and attitudes 
are important for determining choices as well as self-interest. An experiment was 
conducted to determine the motivations behind decisions in a game theory context by 
asking respondents directly what motivated their decisions in six Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games with the strategies ‘share’ or ‘compete’, and 
furthermore determining their overall self-interested beliefs. The responses indicated 
that ethical motivations including altruism, inequality aversion, reciprocity and 
aversion to lying as well as self-interest were considered or used to make choices. The 
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responses indicated strong attitudes regarding altruism and reciprocity and strong 
attitudes towards promises and an aversion to lying, but attitudes regarding inequality 
aversion are mixed. This suggests that self-interest captures the motivations, attitudes 
and values of some respondents, but a significant proportion of respondents do not act 
according to and do not have attitudes that are accurately captured by self-interest 
alone. Furthermore, a significant proportion of respondents have attitudes that are 
accurately captured by negative altruism and inferiority aversion, and hence this 
suggests that some respondents appear to be selfish or even unethical. The literature 
generally supports the finding here that altruism, inequality aversion and reciprocity 
are important alongside self-interest, and that some individuals may be more 
appropriately regarded as selfish.  
 
This study builds on the existing literature but incorporates more motivations than 
previous approaches. This enables multiple explanations for observed behaviour and 
reduces the problem that observed behaviour may be explained by factors other than 
those factors that are analysed. The principal advantage of this study is that the 
motivations behind decisions are determined by asking respondents directly what 
motivated their decisions, whereas studies in the literature observe respondents 
decisions in order to reveal their preferences and to subsequently assign motivations 
that are in accordance with those decisions. Furthermore the relatively large sample 
size in comparison to the literature enables appropriate econometric analysis 
alongside tabulations. 
 
Econometric analysis of the choice to share and the choice to promise demonstrates 
that motivations representing a desire for equality and wanting the highest payoff 
possible are the most important variables across all games. The motivation variables 
are more effective than the attitude variables in the regressions. This is consistent with 
an argument that motivation variables represent principles that are strategically 
important, and these are more important in the regression models than attitude 
variables which represent principles that are intrinsically important. Few personal 
characteristics variables are significant in each game and no variables are significant 
for all games. 
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Games 5 and 6 introduce a prior stage where the respondent can choose to send a 
message to the other player saying ‘I promise I will share’. The results for games 5 
and 6 suggest five points. Firstly there are differences between individuals who 
choose to send a message saying ‘I promise I will share’ and those who actually share. 
Secondly choosing to send a message saying ‘I promise I will share’ increases the 
probability of sharing. Thirdly reciprocity affects responses as the choice to share is 
affected by whether a message is received from the other player. Fourthly the 
knowledge that the other player dislikes lying also affects responses. Fifthly stronger 
attitudes towards keeping promises and an aversion to lying increase the probability 
of keeping a promise but reduce the probability of making a promise. These five 
points suggest that reciprocity and an aversion to lying affect choices in a game theory 
context.  
 
These conclusions are based on a student sample and use only Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and Prisoner’s Dilemma related games. While this game theory setting is 
characteristic of much of the literature, it does not follow that these findings 
necessarily hold in other contexts and for other members of the community. Further 
research is required to examine the importance of ethical motivations and attitudes for 
determining choices in contexts other than Prisoner’s Dilemma related games. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  
Marginal effects for the probit models for the choice to share in all games and the choice to promise in games 5 and 6 
 Game1 Game2 Game3 Game4   Game 5      Game 6    
 ise     Prom
share 
to Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Promise 
to share 
Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Control variables           
Female 0.016         -0.076** -0.052* -0.058** -0.054* 0.098*** -0.030 -0.045* 0.056* -0.054**
Faculty of Architecture       -0.125* -0.092 -0.094 -0.153* -0.073 -0.101 -0.115*** -0.040 0.019 -0.070 
Faculty of Engineering          -0.089* 0.023 -0.046 -0.024 -0.081 0.010 0.053 -0.030 0.006 0.018
Faculty of Law 0.004          -0.084 -0.058 -0.114* 0.047 -0.059 0.019 0.019 0.038 0.040
Faculty of Medicine           -0.033 -0.057 -0.062 -0.089 -0.007 -0.097 -0.033 0.005 -0.060 0.053
Faculty of Pure Science          -0.118*** -0.037 -0.037 -0.020 0.013 0.021 -0.035 0.007 0.018 -0.023
Faculty of Social Science          -0.009 0.013 0.016 -0.010 0.008 -0.015 0.034 -0.009 0.058 0.006
Dual faculty student 0.014          -0.012 0.027 -0.037 0.130*** 0.012 0.046 0.023 -0.017 0.056
Economics student          -0.034 -0.045 -0.042 -0.039 0.092 -0.059 -0.037 0.106** -0.006 -0.024
Age 21-24 0.083*** -0.022         0.041 0.005 0.030 -0.007 0.057** -0.000 0.018 0.009
Age 25-39          0.042 -0.062 0.026 -0.059 0.059 0.074 -0.001 -0.011 0.036 -0.031
Aged 40 or above          0.350*** 0.063 0.040 0.088 -0.068 0.106 0.120 -0.131 0.074 0.243**
Monthly term-time expenditure 
£200 -399 
-0.001 0.054         0.009 0.010 -0.001 -0.074* -0.019 0.018 -0.084** -0.029
Monthly term-time expenditure 
£400 -599 
0.009          0.062 -0.001 0.043 -0.008 -0.017 -0.010 -0.002 -0.004 -0.020
Monthly term-time expenditure 
£600 -799 
-0.092*          0.112* -0.079 0.093 -0.064 -0.130 -0.006 -0.009 -0.035 -0.009
Monthly term-time expenditure 
£800 -999 
0.013          -0.061 -0.045 0.080 0.091 -0.050 -0.013 0.040 -0.129 -0.071
Monthly term-time expenditure 
£1000 -1199 
0.053          0.146* 0.130 0.141* 0.094 0.111 0.000 0.062 -0.104 0.062
Monthly term-time expenditure over 
£1200 
-0.135*         0.270*** 0.141 0.198** -0.038 -0.007 0.024 -0.010 0.077 -0.013
Non-white          -0.100*** -0.093** -0.003 -0.061 0.007 -0.097** -0.012 -0.017 -0.057 -0.000
           
Promise variables           
30
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 Game1 Game2 Game3 Game4   Game 5      Game 6    
     Promise to 
share 
Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Promise 
to share 
Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Game 6 – promise to share          0.336*** 0.128***
Game 5 – promise to share        0.372*** 0.110***   
           
Motivation and attitude variables           
Wanted player 2 to have a high 
payoff 'every time' 
 0.049         
Wanted player 2 to have a high 
payoff 'sometimes' 
 81*          0.0 *
Did not want player 2 to have a high 
payoff 'every time' 
       -0.140*** -0.118*** -0.039 -0.048* -0.094*** -0.177*** -0.089***
Did not want player 2 to have a high 
payoff 'sometimes' 
        -0.105*** -0.084*** 0.058 -0.067*** -0.014 -0.086*** -0.007
Wanted equal payoffs for myself 
and player 2 'every time' 
0.555***          0.466*** 0.545*** 0.285*** 0.309*** 0.389*** 0.238*** 0.264*** 0.281*** 0.249***
Wanted equal payoffs for myself 
and player 2 'sometimes' 
0.193***          0.153*** 0.176*** 0.065** 0.134*** 0.234*** 0.086*** 0.104*** 0.254*** 0.116***
Avoided payoffs for myself that are 
much higher than player 2 'every 
time' 
0.142***          0.092* 0.160*** 0.062 0.004 0.022 0.127*** -0.041 0.117*** 0.146***
Avoiding payoffs for myself that are 
much higher than player 2 
'sometimes' 
0.097***          0.084** 0.071** 0.076** 0.006 0.073* 0.112*** 0.007 0.013 0.094***
Used the potential amounts of 
money received to anticipate the 
choice of player 2 ‘every time’ 
-0.109*** -0.082**         -0.016 -0.177*** -0.023 0.063** -0.070* 0.004
Used the potential amounts of 
money received to anticipate the 
choice of player 2 ‘sometimes’ 
-0.023 -0.072*       0.035 -0.079* -0.034 0.026 -0.114*** -0.036
Did not want to have a low payoff 
'every time' 
-0.205 **          *
Did not want to have a low payoff 
'sometimes' 
-0.044           
Wanted to have the highest payoff 
possible 'every time' 
-0.102**         -0.240*** -0.204*** -0.096* -0.030 -0.112* -0.105*** -0.065 -0.117** -0.100***
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 Game1 Game2 Game3 Game4   Game 5      Game 6    
     Promise to 
share 
Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Promise 
to share 
Message 
received 
No 
message 
received 
Wanted to have the highest payoff 
possible 'sometimes' 
-0.019         -0.096* -0.144*** -0.040 0.015 0.035 -0.076** -0.013 0.003 -0.078**
Responded to the promise of player 
2 'every time where relevant' 
          0.495*** 0.374***
Responded to the promise of player 
2 'sometimes' 
          0.205*** 0.237***
Used whether or not player 2 made a 
promise to share to anticipate their 
choice whether or not to share 
‘every time where relevant’ 
        -0.019 -0.186*** -0.002 -0.208***
Used whether or not player 2 made a 
promise to share to anticipate their 
choice whether or not to share 
‘sometimes’ 
        -0.041 -0.084*** -0.013 -0.149***
Attitude index representing attitudes 
in accordance with self-interest and 
standard economic assumptions of 
self-interest 
-0.349***          -0.363***
Attitude index representing attitudes 
in accordance with altruism 
         0.160 0.173* 0.238** 0.364***
Attitude index representing attitudes 
in accordance with the avoidance 
and undesirability of lying 
      -0.293*** 0.554*** 0.075 -0.207*** 0.594*** 0.120*
Observations 1580          1592 1594 1588 1568 1554 1561 1573 1563 1569
LR Chi-squared           619.19 439.23 490.09 205.37 172.47 835.85 308.27 153.32 706.37 322.65
Pseudo R-squared           0.31 0.20 0.24 0.10 0.08 0.39 0.18 0.08 0.35 0.19
Log likelihood -687.81          -882.74 -765.11 -973.58 -967.73 -643.32 -682.78 -895.07 -649.14 -688.56
Wald test comparing these models 
to the equivalent promise models11
     131.55 58.55    70.33 68.04
Wald test comparing these models 
to the equivalent message received 
models12
         136.95 109.88
Wald test comparing games 5 and 
613
          27.96 16.48 41.74
 
Notes: Reference group consists of ‘male’, ‘faculty of arts’, ‘aged under 21’, ‘monthly term-time expenditure £0-199’, ‘white’, ‘avoided payoffs for myself that are much 
higher than player 2 'never'’, ‘wanted equal payoffs for myself and player 2 'never'’, ‘wanted to have the highest payoff possible 'never'’ and for game 1 ‘used the potential 
amounts of money received to anticipate the choice of player 2 ‘never’’, ‘did not want to have a low payoff 'never'’, ‘have attitudes of weak agreement with statements 
regarding self interest and standard economic assumptions based on self-interest’, and for game 2 ‘used the potential amounts of money received to anticipate the choice of 
player 2 ‘never’’, ‘wanted player 2 to have a high payoff ‘never’’, ‘have attitudes of weak agreement with statements regarding altruism’ and for game 3 ‘have attitudes of 
weak agreement with statements regarding self interest and standard economic assumptions based on self-interest’ and for game 4 ‘did not want player 2 to have a high 
payoff 'never'’ and ‘have attitudes of weak agreement with statements regarding altruism’.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A2  
Pearson’s correlation coefficients for the motivation and attitude variables used in the models estimated in tables 6, 7 and 8 
 
  Wanted player 2 to 
have a high payoff 
‘every time’ 
Avoided payoffs for 
myself that are much 
higher than player 2 
Used the potential 
amounts of money 
received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 
Wanted equal payoffs 
for myself and player 2 
Did not want to have a 
low payoff 
         Every
time 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every
time 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every time Sometimes
Every time 1          Wanted player 2 to 
have a high payoff 
‘every time’ 
Sometimes -0.1903 1         
Every time 0.2643          0.0164 1Avoided payoffs for 
myself that are much 
higher than player 2 
Sometimes 0.004          0.2652 -0.2337 1
Every time -0.0286          0.0937 -0.0411 0.0585 1Used the potential 
amounts of money 
received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 
Sometimes -0.0656         0.0054 -0.05 0.0116 -0.5386 1
Every time 0.2513          0.0968 0.3229 0.1407 -0.0522 -0.1369 1Wanted equal payoffs 
for myself and player 2 Sometimes -0.1331        0.1725 -0.1587 0.1291 0.0919 0.1139 -0.5772 1
Every time -0.0814         -0.0943 -0.1717 -0.1479 0.161 0.0416 -0.3141 0.092 1Did not want to have a 
low payoff Sometimes 0.0455          0.1323 0.0766 0.1952 -0.0979 -0.0074 0.2497 -0.0385 -0.7977 1
Every time 0.0978          0.1267 0.0758 0.1019 0.0481 -0.0535 0.236 -0.0642 -0.0682 0.0994Responded to the 
promise of player 2 Sometimes -0.1192      -0.0479 -0.0774 -0.0261 -0.0107 0.089 -0.1962 0.1488 0.0682 -0.05 
Every time -0.0658       0.1441 -0.0215 0.1852 0.0298 0.1084 -0.0036 0.1618 -0.0704 0.1363Did not want player 2 
to have a high payoff Sometimes 0.093         -0.0143 0.0231 -0.0932 -0.0754 -0.1452 0.1127 -0.15 -0.0575 -0.0269
Every time 0.0007          0.0221 -0.0494 0.0208 0.1437 -0.0875 0.042 -0.028 0.0941 -0.0422Used whether or not 
player 2 made a 
promise to share to 
anticipate their choice 
whether or not to 
share 
Sometimes -0.0446        0.0434 -0.0141 0.0451 -0.0604 0.162 -0.1019 0.1491 -0.0331 0.0497 
Every time -0.0867          -0.2151 -0.1393 -0.2777 0.0813 0.0773 -0.3366 0.0087 0.3765 -0.3Wanted to have the 
highest payoff possible Sometimes -0.0344       0.2458 -0.0039 0.2691 -0.0097 -0.0089 0.1329 0.0979 -0.1647 0.2138
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  Wanted player 2 to 
have a high payoff 
‘every time’ 
Avoided payoffs for 
myself that are much 
higher than player 2 
Used the potential 
amounts of money 
received to anticipate 
the choice of player 2 
Wanted equal payoffs 
for myself and player 2 
Did not want to have a 
low payoff 
         Every
time 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every
time 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every time Sometimes
Attitude index representing altruism 0.1053          0.0358 0.0816 0.0652 0.0069 -0.0051 0.1785 -0.0451 -0.0788 0.0397
Attitude index representing attitudes 
in accordance with the avoidance 
and undesirability of lying 
0.0861         0.046 0.0387 0.0598 -0.0646 -0.0308 0.1445 -0.0046 -0.0597 0.0225
Attitude index representing self-
interest and standard economic 
assumptions based on self-interest 
-0.1067          -0.0682 -0.0973 -0.0807 0.0271 0.0721 -0.246 0.0962 0.1157 -0.0585
 
 
  Responded to the 
promise of player 2 
Did not want player 2 
to have a high payoff 
Used whether or not 
player 2 made a 
promise to share to 
anticipate their 
choice whether or not 
to share 
Wanted to have the 
highest payoff
possible 
 
       Every
time, 
where 
relevant 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every
time, 
where 
relevant 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes 
Attitude 
index 
representing 
altruism 
Attitude index 
representing 
attitudes in 
accordance 
with the 
avoidance 
and 
undesirability 
of lying 
Every 
time, 
where 
relevant 
1          Responded to the promise of 
player 2 
Sometimes -0.8004 1         
Every time -0.07 0.1505 1        Did not want player 2 to 
have a high payoff Sometimes 0.1674          -0.1933 -0.6901 1
Used whether or not player 
2 made a promise to share 
to anticipate their choice 
whether or not to share 
Every 
time, 
where 
relevant 
0.3421          -0.2226 -0.0552 0.0817 1
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 Responded to the 
promise of player 2 
Did not want player 2 
to have a high payoff 
Used whether or not 
player 2 made a 
promise to share to 
anticipate their 
choice whether or not 
to share 
Wanted to have the 
highest payoff
possible 
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       Every
time, 
where 
relevant 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes Every
time, 
where 
relevant 
 Sometimes Every
time 
Sometimes 
Attitude 
index 
representing 
altruism 
Attitude index 
representing 
attitudes in 
accordance 
with the 
avoidance 
and 
undesirability 
of lying 
Sometimes -0.2499          0.326 0.157 -0.1684 -0.7714 1
Every time -0.163         0.1235 -0.0769 -0.0988 0.0249 0.0117 1Wanted to have the highest 
payoff possible Sometimes 0.115          -0.0584 0.1408 -0.0182 0.0243 0.016 -0.7891 1
Attitude index representing altruism 0.1765         -0.1093 0.0211 0.073 0.0687 -0.0725 -0.1222 0.051 1
Attitude index representing attitudes in 
accordance with the avoidance and 
undesirability of lying 
0.2719          -0.2041 -0.0322 0.1484 0.0947 -0.1051 -0.1063 0.0511 0.3277 1
Attitude index representing self-interest 
and standard economic assumptions 
based on self-interest 
-0.2055          0.1315 0.0461 -0.1946 -0.0903 0.0998 0.2141 -0.0995 -0.5232 -0.3996
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Refer to Sethi and Somanathan (2003) for a comprehensive discussion of the large literature using 
game theory to model reciprocity. 
2 The use of internet experiments is becoming increasingly popular, for a comprehensive discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages see Charness et al. (2007). The questionnaire is available from the 
authors on request. 
3 In the questionnaire the explanation of each game includes details clearly explaining how much each 
player receives for every combination of choices from the respondent and the other player, player 2.  
The explanation of games 2 to 6 includes details of how the payoffs are changed from the previous 
game in order to firstly clearly indicate the differences between the payoffs in that game and previous 
games, secondly make the instructions as clear as possible and thirdly enable respondents to be able to 
quickly understand the differences in each of the games. No information is given regarding how the 
respondent could or should make their decision, hence the individual will have to determine their own 
criteria for making their choice, and even if they are already familiar with game theory they must 
decide whether to act in accordance with the theory. 
4 A probit model with an equivalent dependent variable which equals 1 for cooperate and 0 for defect is 
used in Hu and Liu (2003). Their estimated model uses personal characteristics, promises received and 
payoff levels as regressors.  
5 Fong (2007) uses similar model specifications to the models specified here. For example, Fong (2007) 
uses an instrumental variable regression of offers in an n-donor dictator game on predicted values of 
posterior beliefs and on personal characteristics variables. Fong (2007) also uses median and OLS 
regressions predicting offers in n-donor dictator games using dummy variables as regressors 
representing mid and high values of the HE scale, which is a constructed measure of attitudes derived 
from responses to multiple attitudinal questions. 
6 The University of Sheffield had a student population of 23,399 in February 2006. All responses were 
collected from 18 February 2006 until 23 March 2006. The response rate is higher than other research-
based online questionnaires undertaken at the University of Sheffield that generally have a response 
rate of 2-4.5%. 
7 Ages shown are for full-time students at the University of Sheffield only due to data availability, yet 
all part-time and full-time students were requested to complete the questionnaire. 
8 The choice of responses regarding reciprocity and lying as motivating factors were ‘every time where 
relevant’, ‘sometimes’ and ‘never’, as promises are only used in games 5 and 6 and hence reciprocity 
and an aversion to lying are unlikely to be motivating factors for the other games. 
9 The attitudes and motivations of economics students is discussed in Rowen and Dietrich (2007). 
10 A bivariate probit approach of the choice to share and the choice to promise was also used for games 
5 and 6, and a log likelihood ratio test of rho indicated that the error terms were not correlated and 
hence the univariate approach is appropriate. 
11 Wald test for equality of coefficients for the models of the choice to share and the choice to promise 
for the same specification of model. For example, for game 5 the model of the choice to share when no 
message is received is compared to the choice to share when a message is received. The altruism index 
and dummy variable only appear in the promise equation and hence the equality of coefficients is not 
tested for these variables. 
12 Wald test for equality of coefficients for the models for the share equations when a message is 
received and when no message is received for the same specification of model in this table. Some 
motivations only appear in the models when a message is received and hence for these regressions the 
equality of coefficients is not tested for these variables. 
13 Wald test for equality of coefficients for the models for game 6 for the same specification of model 
for game 5. For example, the Wald test statistic has the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
for game 6 are equal to those for the model which has the same specification but is calculated using the 
data collected for game 5. 
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